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k a n sa s g e n e r a l a s s e mb l y a r e o f in ter est

In our last report, the 2013 Arkansas Legislative Session was about to expire,
though it was then too early to assess the damage. Nowthat the dust has fully settled,
let us review:
Act No. 1062 made certain amendments to existing statutes2 concerning the
timing and method of the payment of royalties. Most importantly, the act increased from
$100 to $150 the amount of royalty which may be accumulated over a period not
exceeding twelve months. A royalty owner may decrease that amount to $50, upon
written demand. Royalty up to $10 may be accumulated indefinitely except that it must
be paid upon cessation of production or upon the payor’s relinquishment of
responsibility for making the royalty payment. Also, the act expressly authorizes
electronic payment of royalties and provides that required “check stub” information may
be “made accessible in electronic form,” as an alternative to paper form.
Act No. 1299, titled the “Landowner Notification Act," amended Arkansas Code §
15-72-203 to require a lengthy list of information to be provided to a surface owner prior

1 Member, Daily & Woods, P.L.L.C., Fort Smith, Arkansas: Adjunct Professor, University
of Arkansas (Fayetteville) School of Law.
2 The amended code sections are Ark Code Ann §§ 15-72-305(a)(3)(A)(iii)(b), 15-72305(a)(3)(B)(ii)(a), 15-72-305(a)(3)(5)(A), 15-74-601 (a) and (b ) and 15-74-601.

to conducting “shale operations”3 upon that owner’s land. The Act requires the
Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission to promulgate rules implementing the Act. The
Commission did just that in amendments to its General Rule B-1, which now mirrors the
Notification Act.
Act No. 1520 requires that ad valorem tax reappraisals of producing mineral
interests occur annually, rather than every five years as under previous law. This act
was inspired by the manner in which county tax assessors value producing minerals
based upon previous production multiplied by an assumed price. Assessors were
refusing to change the assumed price in the formula, even though the gas prices had
fallen drastically, and relied upon the five-year reappraisal rule in the previous statute as
authority for taking that somewhat unconscionable position.4
Act No. 262 was sponsored by Senator Maloch. That act amended ACA § 1572-103(a)(1) to authorize a civil penalty of up to $100,000 per violation for illegally
dumping or disposing of unauthorized fluids or substances into a well or upon a well
site. The Oil and Gas Commission then amended its General Rule A-5 to reflect its new
fining authority under the Act.
I come from relatively crime-free North Arkansas. I was unaware that illegal
dumping into wells was a problem in the South-woods. Moreover, l am totally unfamiliar
with whatever incident(s) inspired this legislation. However, I know Senator Maloch to
be one of the very best members of the General Assembly, particularly when oil and

3 As defined by the Act.
4 pparently at the direction of the state’s Department of Finance and Administration,
A
Assessment Coordination Division.
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gas issues are involved, so I do not intend to argue with him.
I hope the 100-grand fine is an effective deterrent If not, perhaps the 2015
Legislature can pass another law, authorizing pumpers to pack heat and placing a
bounty upon dumpers brought in by pumpers, whether dead or alive.
Ar

ka n s a s

Supreme Cou rt Hold s t h a t Po ss es si o n Un d er Unr ecorded C on
Sa l e C onstitu tes “ A c tu a l Not ice ” t o Oil and Gas Les see

tra ct o f

Walls v. Humphries5 surprised me, to say the very least. Walls is the named
Appellant, but the case is really about Hernandez, who was the purchaser of a tract of
land under an unrecorded contract of sale. Hernendez alleged that he and his family
were in possession of the land covered by that contract. However, the record owner of
the land was one Humphries, who had sold it under the unrecorded contract. SEECO,
Inc, which acted without actual knowledge of Hernandez’ interest, secured an oil and
gas lease from Humphries. Paraclifta, also without knowledge of Hernandez’ interest,
secured a mineral deed from Humphries.
The litigation which ensued involved Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-404, which
provides, in part:
No deed ...shall be good...against a subsequent purchaser of the real estate for a
valuable consideration without actual notice thereof... unless the deed... is filed for
record...”6
Relying upon that statutory language, the trial court granted summary
judgment, holding that SEECO and Paraclifta were innocent purchasers, not bound by
Hernandez’ unrecorded interest The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in Walls v.

52013 Ark 286, 2013 WL 3239042.
6Emphasis Added.
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Humphries.7 I applauded that decision in this presentation to the 2012 Natural
Resources Law institute, concluding that it indicated a judicial limitation of the Arkansas
Supreme Court’s holding in Killam v. Texas Oil and Gas C orp8 You may recall that in
Killam, a mineral deed necessary to the Killams’ title was unrecorded, but another
recorded deed, as well as tax assessments, provided clues to the existence of the
Killams' interest. The court held in that case that Texas Oil and Gas had a duty, having
seen those instruments, to discover the Killams’ interest. My reaction to the Court of
Appeals opinion in Walls v. Humphries was that perhaps this duty to inquire was only
triggered by other recorded instruments. While we would still have to live with Killam,
nothing worse had happened.
But wait!! Remember what Yogi said about “when it’s over." The Arkansas
Supreme Court accepted review of Walls v. Humphries on a totally unrelated issue and
then proceeded to reverse the case’s principal holding. The Supreme Court ruled that
the summary judgment was improper. If Hernandez’ possession was open, exclusive
and notorious, it constituted “actual notice” under the recording act, trumping SEECO’s
lease and Paraclifta’s mineral deed, even though neither SEECO nor Paraclifta had any
knowledge about Hernandez. Whether Hernandez’ possession met that standard was
an issue of fact.
I was amazed and disappointed by the court’s decision. I even commented on
the Natural Resources Section’s listserv that the court was clearly wrong. I was quickly

72012 Ark. App. 4, 2012, 2012 WL 11458.
8 303 Ark. 547, 298 S.W.2d 419 (1990).
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corrected by Professors Norvell and Foster,9 who explained that I should have learned
in law school that possession of land was notice to all the world-always had been.
Research proved the professors to be right although most of the case law on this issue
is pretty ancient.10
In its opinion, the court dealt with the issue as though it was determining
whether SEECO and Paraclifta qualified as Bona Fide Purchasers for Value (BFP’s) of
their interests. We know that BFP’s are purchasers for value, without notice of adverse
interests. This is not really a BFP issue, because it involves the interpretation of a
statute. Being inquisitive, I wondered if the word "actual” before "notice” in the statute,
changed anything. Alas, it apparently does not.
For example, Black’s Law Dictionary contains a listing for the term “Actual
Notice.” However, Black’s definition of “Actual Notice” is simply “See Notice.”11
Moreover, the overwhelming weight of cases defining or explaining what is meant by
“actual notice" of a fact explain that the term means either knowing that the fact exists or
having available the tools to learn that the fact exists. In other words, “actual” preceding
“notice” is as useless as the "p” in psoriasis.12 Then, to make matters worse,

I learned

that the Walls v. Humphries holding is not even unique to Arkansas. For example, in
the Mississippi case of Gulf Refining Co. v. Travis13 an owner whose interest was
unrecorded and whose “possession" was only through her tenant, prevailed over an oil
9 Real property law professors teaching at UAF and UALR Law Schools, respectively.
10 The most recent Arkansas case cited by the court for the premise that possession
equals actual notice were decided in 1948. Most were decided before 1900.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
12 A condition which is likewise not particularly useful for much of anything except,
perhaps, heartbreak.
13 201 Miss. 336, 29 So. 2d 100 (1947).
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and gas lessee w ith no knowledge of the owner’s interest.

Still, the fact remains that oil and gas companies, leasing in the middle of a lease
play, have need to rely upon record title and seldom have the time or resources to
check on possession. As you know, mineral owners do not even own the surface
above. In those cases possession is clearly immaterial. Indeed, to those who drill in
640 acre units for gas, all of the surface is immaterial, except that needed for well sites
or pipelines.
How, as a practical matter, do you check possession in this day and age? Our
society has become far more mobile. People do not just stay put any more. What if the
owner is not home. How long must you wait for his return? Can you rely upon what the
babysitter tells you? Perhaps it is time to understand that possession is not what it used
to be when court houses were days away by horseback and conveyances were by
livery of seisin.14
Understand, it is not the Supreme Court’s job to change the law to keep up with
the times. That is a job for the Legislature. If this rule is to change, it will require a
change to the recording act Merely substituting “actual knowledge" for “actual notice"
would solve much of the oil and gas industry’s problem. Perhaps, that could be further
14 The seisin, as representing the freehold interest of the tenant, was at common law
made use of for the purpose of a conveyance of such interest, the latter being in fact
transferable only by a delivery of the possession of the land, called “livery of seisin.”
This livery of seisin was effected by the delivery on the land, “in name of seisin of the
land,” of a turf or twig (livery in deed), or by a statement made in view of the land to the
effect that possession was given, followed by entry by the alienee (livery in law). This
ceremony was usually accompanied by a deed or charter “of feoffment,” as it was
called, attesting the livery of seisin, and stating the purpose, nature, and extent of the
transfer, the whole transaction being known as a “feoffment." (1 Tiffany Real Prop. §
22 (3d ed.) (citations omitted).
6

improved by placing the burden of proving actual knowledge upon the party claiming
through the unrecorded interest. Before we jump on that wagon we need to consider
whether we might be creating more problems than we solve, but that is for another
discussion. The bottom line here is that the decision in Waffs v. Humphries, while
practically difficult to stomach, is based upon solid case precedentand unlikely to
change except through legislation.
Ar k a n s a s
_____Int erest

s u p r e me Cou rt Int erprets
a Min e ra l Deed Con ve yi n g an Und iv id ed
as Effe c tiv el y Co nve ying A ll o f G r a n t o r ’ s Min e r a l In te res t

Back in BC15 many conveyances were accomplished by fill-in-the-blanks forms.
A mineral buyer would simply tear a form from his pad, use a pen to fill in each blank in
the form, procure the grantor’s signature, get that signature acknowledged, and record
the deed. Barton Land Services. Inc. v. SEECO. Inc.16 dealt with one of those
transactions, obviously left incomplete in haste. At issue was a 1929 mineral deed, left
partially uncompleted as follows:
[R.F. Thomas and Amy Thomas]... do hereby grant bargain, sell and
convey unto the said J.S. Martin Trustee and to his heirs and assigns
forever, an undivided____interest in and to all the oil, gas and other
minerals, in, under and upon the following described lands lying within the
County of Van Buren and State of Arkansas, to-wit: [description of the
three tracts] containing 221.35 acres, more or less.
The Thomases had owned 100% of the minerals beneath the lands described in
the deed. The question for the court: What, if anything, goes into the open blank?
Successors in interest to the grantor, including Barton Land Services, argued that
leaving an essential term17 of the contract uncompleted caused the deed to be void for
15 Before computers.
162013 Ark. 231,___S.W.3d___ , 2013 WL 2361043 (2013).
17 The quantity of interest conveyed.
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vagueness. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed. Applying the presumption that a
grantor who deeds without exception or reservation conveys his entire interest, the
Court ruled that the uncompleted deed conveyed the grantors’ entire 100% interest to
the deed’s grantee.
Two 2013 A rka n sa s C ou rt o f A ppea ls Dec is ion
Vo id Min e r a l Qu ie t Tit l e Dec ree s

s

Those of us who examine title are frequently confronted by quiet title decrees
purporting to confirm title to previously severed mineral interests in persons who never
owned them. The claims of those mineral claimants are often based upon void tax
deeds, and nearly always include a bogus allegation that the plaintiff has adversely
possessed the severed interest.18 We have long treated these quiet title decrees as
essentially worthless, much to the annoyance of the ‘Winners” in those lawsuits and
their attorneys, who had charged good money to obtain the worthless court orders.
Now we have a couple of decisions of Arkansas’ Court of Appeals to back us up.
Wright v. Viele19involved a 1991 decree purporting to quiet title to 100% of the
minerals beneath a subject tract. The successors to a person named E. Graves, who
were the owners 50% of that mineral interest, were not personally served in connection
with the quiet title suit. Rather, they were "served” constructively, by published warning
order. That warning order incorrectly referred to their predecessor’s name as “E. Crow.”

18 In Arkansas, as in most jurisdictions, adverse possession of a severed mineral
interest can only be accomplished by actual production of the severed mineral, contrary
to the rights of the true owner. (See Daily, Thomas A. and Barrier, W. Christopher,
Well, Now, Ain’t that Just Fugacious!: A Basic Primer on Arkansas Oil and Gas Law,
(hereinafter "Fugacious I") Ch. VIII, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 211 at 222-224.
192012 Ark. App. 471___ S.W.3d___ 2013 WL 4746668 (2013).
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Noting that constructive service is in derogation of the common law, the Court of
Appeals stated that “statutory service requirements are strictly construed and
compliance with them must be exact." Hence, the appeals court affirmed the trial
court's decree voiding the 1991 decree.
In a similar holding in the second case, the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed
a trial court order upholding a 2009 quiet title decree. That case was Heirs o f Duncan v.
Alfred T. Williams Living Trust.20 Mancil and Sylvia Duncan were residents of Tyler,
Texas who owned land in Arkansas. When they sold that land to the predecessors of
the Williams Trust in 1963, Mancil and Sylvia reserved a one-half mineral interest. In
2009 the Williams Trust brought suit to quiet title to the Duncans' mineral interest. By
then, both Mancil and Sylvia were deceased, but their heirs resided in the same family
house in Tyler. The appeals court determined that counsel for the Williams Living Trust
had not conducted the statutorily required diligent inquiry to locate the Duncan Heirs
prior to attempting to constructively serve them by publication of a warning order.

Had

such an inquiry been conducted, the Duncan Heirs likely could have been located and
personally served with process. These decisions indicate that Arkansas’ appeals courts
are willing to go behind the decrees in such suits to confirm compliance with statutory
service requirements and fundamental due process.
Re a s o n a b l e Surf ace Us e
W rongful
a nd The refore

b y Oil and Gas Lessee is
is No t C om pe n sa b le

No t

Pollard v. Seeco, In c 21 was a surface damage case. SEECO, Inc. was
the owner of an oil and gas lease executed by Pollard. Pollard had also executed a
202013 Ark. App. 740, 2013 WL 6565804 (2013).
212013 Ark. App. 331,___S.W.3d___ , 2013 WL 2099809.
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surface-use agreement with SEECO, for separate consideration.
However, after SEECO constructed a drilling pad upon lands which Pollard
alleged were “part of the future development activity which had already been
commenced...," Pollard sued for damages. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a
summary judgment for SEECO, based, in part, upon an affidavit of a SEECO geologist
stating that the well was drilled in conformance with industry standards, that it used an
area of normal and reasonable size and that it was at a geologically desirable location.
A mineral lessee who conducts surface operations is liable only if those operations are
conducted unreasonably.
Pollard should not be interpreted as giving oil and gas companies license to run
roughshod over surface owners. Arkansas follows the Reasonable Accommodation
Doctrine with respect to conflicts between the surface and mineral estates.22 That
doctrine concedes that the mineral owner (lessee)’s right of surface ingress exists, but
requires it to be exercised with “due regard” to the interests of the surface owner. In
Pollard, SEECO presented uncontroverted proof that it had complied with its duty to
accommodate Pollard, and thus was not liable to him.
Un it ed St at e s Dis t ri ct Cou rt Grants Su mma r y J ud g me nt t o Lessee in L ea se
Ca n c e l l a t io n Su it — Less ors Fa il e d t o Give Notic e o f Brea ch
In Lews v. Enerquest Oil and Gas. LLC23 the lessors sued Enerquest, the
operator of the Chalybeat Springs Fieldwide Unit in Columbia County, seeking
cancellation of their oil and gas leases, outside of producing formations based upon
alleged violation of the Implied Covenant to Develop. The lessors’ primary contention
22See Fugacious I, supra, at 224-228.
23 USDC (W.D. Ark., El Dorado Division) Case No. 12-CV-1067.
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was that Enerquest had failed to develop the Lower Smackover (Brown Dense)
Formation. The United States District Court24 granted Summary Judgment to
Enerquest holding the oil and gas leases required the lessors to give Enerquest notice
of any alleged breach, together with an opportunity to cure the breach, prior to bringing
suit. The lessors had contended that a prior request which some of them had made to
the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission, seeking dissolution of the unit, constituted the
required notice. However, the court ruled that the request to the Commission was not
made on behalf of all Plaintiffs, and, at any rate, was insufficient, because it requested
dissolution of the unit, not development of the Brown Dense Formation.
Enerquest also attached a geologist’s affidavit to its summary judgment motion.
In that affidavit Enerquest’s witness opined that a prudent operator in Enerquest’s
position would not have explored the Brown Dense Formation, and that Enerquest had
acted as a prudent operator as to other zones. The court declined to rule on that basis,
however, stating that it was unnecessary for her to do so, given the summary judgment
on the notice issue.
In case you are wondering, the district court’s decision on the notice issue does
not conflict with Arkansas’ decision in Byrd v. Bradham25 The cases are
distinguishable. In Byrd, it was contended by the defendant/lessee that principles of
equity precluded lease cancellation without notice and the chance to cure. The
Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that principal, in theory, but concluded that the
non-development had gone on so long as to constitute abandonment of the leased

24 Hon. Susan Hickey.
25 280 Ark. 11, 329 S.W.2d 252 (1983).
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acreage by the lessee. Thus, notice was excused under the circumstances. In Lewis ,
on the other hand, the notice was required by an express lease provision, and
Enerquest had done considerable work in the unit, so a finding of abandonment was
improbable.
Th is J us t In : C our

t of

Ap p e a l s Sa ves Ch e s a p e a k e ’ s Go o s e (Pa r

t ia l l y )

In a brand new decision, Chesapeake Exploration. LLC v. Whillock26 the
Arkansas Court of Appeals partially reversed a summary judgment entered by a trial
court27 which would have allowed the Whillocks to retain a lease bonus paid by
Chesapeake on a mineral interest which they never owned. Here is what happened.
The Whillocks owned the surface of 80 acres in Van Buren County. They knew
that they did not own the mineral rights. When a landman representing Chesapeake
approached them for a lease on the tract, the Whillocks told him they owned no
minerals, but, according to the Whillocks, the landman insisted, so eventually they
executed a five-year lease and took his check for $120,000. The paid income taxes on
the $120,000 bonus and spent the rest.
Fourteen months later Chesapeake saw a drilling title opinion which indicated
that the Whillocks, indeed, owned only surface. Thus Chesapeake wrote to the
Whillocks requesting refund of the bonus. That letter enclosed a release of the lease,
which Chesapeake then recorded.
When the Whillocks failed to refund the bonus, Chesapeake sued, relying upon

262014 Ark. App. 55.
27Hon. Michael Maggio.

12

the warranty in the lease. There was just one problem. The lease had been released.
Fortunately for Chesapeake, it alternatively sued for unjust enrichment. The Circuit
Court granted the Whillocks’ motion for summary judgment ruling that the release of the
lease was a general release of all claims.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, but only in part. The appeals court
affirmed the summary judgment as to the breach-of-warranty claim. It reversed the
judgment dismissing Chesapeake’s unjust enrichment claim, and remanded that part of
the case for trial.
Chesapeake is far from home free. As the court observed, unjust enrichment is
an equitable cause of action, subject to equitable defenses. Since the Whillocks
claimed that Chesapeake should be barred by the equitable defenses of estoppel and
misrepresentation the case was remanded to circuit court for trial on those issues. The
Whillocks may have a home-field advantage there, considering that they spent the
money in reliance upon the landman’s insistence.
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